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Search algorithm to find optimum strategies to 
shape political action with subjective 
assessment 
J. Rodrigo, M.D. López, S. Lantarón, R. Caro 
Abstract—This paper introduces a problem related to decision-
making and the shaping of political strategies in the course of one 
term of office, in which the government and the opposition shape 
their proposals for action on two issues that are relevant for the 
citizens. A variable component is considered regarding both the 
relevance of the issues to be dealt with and the strategies that the 
parties are presumed to adopt. The aim of this study is to find the 
optimum strategies for the two majority parties of a country, while 
allowing them to vary their proposals to a certain degree. In addition, 
the process is dynamic because the proposals are intended to be 
modified taking into account the other party's foreseen action. The 
contribution of this article lies in this approach, as well as in its 
taking into account variable components. The problem is dealt with 
from a geometric point of view, and a search algorithm to find 
optimum strategies is developed. 
Keywords— Computational geometry, Operations research, 
Search algorithms. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Models of point location have been studied in various fields such as industrial organization, image processing, 
and movement of robots [6]. Optimum strategy models 
have also been proposed for locating parties in political 
economy research [14], [15]. Most of these models consider 
the population as a continuum [3]. Novel elements of this 
research include working with a discrete population, applying 
techniques and results from computational geometry as 
adapted to the problem, and considering weighted distances 
and neighborhoods as well as uncertainty parameters. 
This research tries to solve a particular kind of political 
economy problem [18], [20] using geometric tools. The points 
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of a plañe, called here the policy plañe, represent various 
political options with respect to two important topics. It is 
assumed that the distances between points can be used to 
represent the affinity of the citizens to the policies represented 
by the points [16], [17], [13], [1], [2]. Because the relevance 
of the topics to be dealt with need not be the same and may not 
even be perfectly determined, it is proposed to attach a 
weighting parameter to each topic. This parameter is 
introduced by means of weighted Euclidean distance. 
The aim of this study is to find optimum strategies to be 
followed by the two majority parties of a country (government 
and opposition), while still allowing them to fine-tune their 
proposals to a certain extent. In addition, the process is 
sequential, because the proposals are intended to be modified 
taking into account the other party's foreseen action. The 
contribution of this research lies in these approaches, as well 
as in the consideration of subjective components. 
The article is structured as follows: the model and 
preliminaries of the problem are explained in Section II. In 
Section III, the search strategies to find optimum positions are 
developed, and the search algorithms are presented. An 
example is developed in Section IV. 
II. THE MODEL 
Because politics is highly complex, it is necessary to 
simplify the model by restricting the analysis to a small 
number of representative issues. It is known that societies 
develop low-dimensional mental models of political decisions, 
so this restriction is appropriate for this study. Indeed, it is 
possible to extrapólate voters' positions on certain issues from 
their positions on other issues, and therefore a policy space of 
two or three dimensions should suffice [4]. 
Concretely, this research focuses on two topics which are 
relevant to the citizenry. A policy plañe is defined by these two 
currently relevant issues, with the two political parties 
represented by points t¡ and t2 and the location of the n voters 
represented by points v¡,...,v„ [20]. By considering the 
appropriate perpendicular bisector at the defined distance, it is 
possible to calcúlate the number of voters that will choose 
each party by determining their proximity or affinity to its 
policy. It is accepted that each party can change its policy 
within a certain neighborhood with the objective of obtaining 
the greatest possible number of voters. The objective is to find 
the optimum location for one party in this neighborhood, that 
is to say, the location that ensures the greatest number of 
supporters. By assuming that this party will choose one of 
these positions, it is intended to determine the other party's 
reply, that is, the optimum strategy to prepare for the other 
party's possible proposal. 
The essence of this problem can be seen as a discrete 
versión of the Voronoi game. In this game, two players lócate 
several points in the plañe in an effort to claim the greatest 
possible área [11], [9], [19], [7]. In the present problem, two 
points are located so as to earn the greatest possible number of 
points (voters) instead of the greatest área. 
The consideration of restrictions on the movement of the 
parties represents an alternative to the analysis presented by 
[4], in which a continuous model with more than two parties 
but without restriction of neighborhoods is considered, or that 
of [22], in which a simplified model on a discrete rather than a 
continuous real space is discussed. 
Let us now formalize the model by representing the political 
stance adopted by the government and the opposition on each 
of the two topics as points t1=\tl,t2) a n d h=V\ ,t2) and 
letting v, =\yl,v2), /—l,..., n, be the coordinates which 
represent the preferences on these topics for the n voters of a 
certain population. 
In the game presented here, the utility function of a policy t¡ 
for each voter v, is defined as: 
y(t3,v)=-d(t},v)\ 
where d(t -,v¿) represents the weighted Euclidean distance 
between political position t- and voter v,: 
dltj.v^Jafyí - í / ) 2 +( l -a)(v 2 -t2Jf . 
Parameter a e (0,1) indicates the importance of each of the 
topics to be dealt with. 
The payoff functions in the game are given by: 
II (;j,;2) = number of points v¿ such thatrf(v¿,;j)< af(v¿,;2) 
n \t\,t2) = number of points v¡ such that rf(v¿,;j)> d(yi,t2) = 
The set of voters siding with the first party will be the subset 
of voters that are closer to position t¡ than to the position of the 
second party. To lócate these voters, we use the bisector of the 
line between / ; and t2, which is given by: 
{(x,y)e9l2 la{x-t\f +{\-a){y-tl2f = 
a(x-t2)2+(l-a)(y-t22)2} 
Because politics is a dynamic process in which each party 
reacts to proposals presented by its adversary, the game of 
choosing the political stance that each party will adopt must 
now be defined. 
Given the proposals made by a country's majority parties on 
particular topics, the governing party searches for an optimum 
strategy that brings it closer to the máximum number of 
citizens within a neighborhood that represents its ideological 
flexibility. On the other hand, the opposition party is ready for 
this reaction by the government and prepares a different 
strategy in its flexibility neighborhood with a view to finding 
the best reply to any of the possible optimum stances taken by 
the government. Thus, the parties' positions evolve within 
their flexibility neighborhoods. These kinds of sequential 
games have already been presented in the continuous case by 
[20]. 
These flexibility neighborhoods will also be affected by the 
weighting assigned to each topic. They are defined as follows: 
Dcfinition 1. Starting with the initial position of each party 
\Xo,y'o), Í—1,2, its flexibility neighborhood is defined as: 
Ni={(x,y)e(ñ2/a(x-x'0f+(l-a)(y-y'0f < R2 }, where 
R¡, i=l,2, represents the degree of flexibility of each party, that 
is, N¡ is the inner región of the ellipse centered on the initial 
position taken by the party, whose semi-axes are —=• and 
•Ja 
•d\-a 
It can be seen that the lower the relevance of one of the 
topics to be dealt with, say the first (a closer to zero), the 
greater the flexibility that is granted to the party to handle it. 
This behavior is logical because the parties must stay closer to 
their initial ideological stances when dealing with a highly 
relevant topic. 
Throughout the paper, it is assumed that the neighborhoods 
of both parties have an empty intersection, that is, N¡niN2=0. 
A. Classijying voters by región 
The flexibility neighborhood of each party ensures it a certain 
number of voters, no matter which location its adversary 
occupies within its neighborhood. Therefore, the points in the 
voter set can be classified into three regions: 
Sure voters for party t¡. 
Sure voters for party t2. 
Undecided voters who can be captured by the party 
that places itself in the appropriate área of each 
voter's neighborhood. These voters are decisive, and 
the campaign and political proposals must be oriented 
towards them. 
Certain regions can then be determined and interpreted as 
described following: 
a) Points that / ; always captures: 
Points \y[, v2 j that belong to the set: 
{(x,y)/max{4(*,y),(ci,c2):with (cx ,c2)eN1]}< d[(x,y),N2]}. 
The boundary of this set is: 
,¡a{x-xl)2 + (l-a)(y-y2)2 -i¡a{x-x\)2 + {\-a){y-yl)2 
= Ri+R2 
The sure voters for the first party are those located in the 
región bounded by this curve where the party is located. 
b) Points that t2 always captures: 
Points \y[, v'2 j that belong to the set: 
{(x.j)/ maxI^^x.^j^Cj, c2): with (cl, c2) e N2 ]} < d[(;>y),^1 ]} • 
The boundary of the set is: 
i¡a{x-x\)2 + {\-a){y-y\)2 -^ja(x-x¡f +(l-a)(y-y2)2 
= Rl+R2 
The sure voters for the second party are those located in the 
región bounded by this curve where the party is located. 
The undecided voters are those located between the two 
curves determined above. 
To model the importance of the topics with respect to each 
other, it is convenient to weight the distances between points. 
The curves bounding the regions that classify the voters keep 
changing, and so do the regions captured, depending on the 
weights. 
Figure 1 illustrates these regions in the particular case in 
which both parties' initial positions agree on one of the topics. 
Inthisexample, (xl,yl) = (0,0), (x¡,y¡) = (2,0), R ^ R ^ l / 2 , 
and a varíes from 0.2 to 0.9 in steps of 0.1. In these cases, 
one of the topics (here, the second topic) is not relevant 
because both parties initially agree on it. In this case, a greater 
weight and consequently a greater relevance for the first topic 
means that the región of sure voters for each party increases 
and contains the regions corresponding to lower weights. 
Thus, the number of undecided voters decreases depending on 
the importance of the topic being considered. 
Fig. 1: Regions for capturing the máximum number of voters when 
the parties agree on one of the policies they offer 
III. STRATEGIESFORTHE SEARCH FOR OPTIMUM POSITIONS 
A. Search for an optimum position for the governing party 
The following proposition makes it possible to search for an 
optimum position for the first party: 
Proposition 1: An optimum position t¡ for the first party, 
given a position t2 for the second party, is found on the 
boundary of N¡ in the are of the ellipse located between the 
two points p', p" of the tangent lines from t2 to the ellipse 
(the part of TV; which is visible from t2), as shown in Figure 2. 
Fig. 2: The are delimits an área with máximum votes for ti. 
Inside the are defined in Proposition 1, let.4 be the región 
which captures the máximum number of votes for the first 
party. The procedure to be followed to determine A is based on 
calculating the área of máximum intersection between this are 
{(x,y)eK2/a(x-vl)2+(l-a)(y-v'2)2< 
and the sets with 
a(t¡-v[)2+(l-a)(t22-v'2)2} 
/'=!,...,«, as shown in Figure 3. 
Fig. 3 The marked are represents the área on the border of N¡ with 
máximum votes for t¡ given points v¡, v2. 
- Algorithm for the calculation of región .4 
The algorithm for obtaining A results from a generalization 
of the algorithm presented in [1] to the case of weighted 
Euclidean distances. The complexity of the algorithm in the 
worst case is therefore 0(n log n) [6]. The procedure is 
detailed in Appendix A. 
B. Reply strategies for the opposition 
The opposition party realizes that, taking its initial position 
at a starting point, the government will choose a position, 
located in región .4, which guarantees it the máximum number 
of supporters. Now the opposition must prepare an appropriate 
reply strategy. To this end, it is assumed that the opposition 
party will follow the most conservative stance; that is, it must 
find the optimum location, the one that ensures it the 
máximum number of followers, whatever the position of the 
first party in this optimum región. Proposition 2 determines 
this optimum location under this assumption. 
Proposition 2: Within N2, let B be the región which captures 
the máximum number of votes for the second party, assuming 
that the first party is located in A Región B is calculated as the 
máximum intersection in N2 of the neighborhoods centered on 
the voters with a radius equal to the minimum distance 
between these voters and A 
{(x,y)edl2 /a(x-v[)2 +(l-aXy-v'2)2 <(d(V¡,A))2}, 
with i=l,...,n. 
Remark: The distance from an external point to a 
neighborhood is attained in the intersection of the segment that 
joins the point with the center of the neighborhood and the 
border of this neighborhood. Thus, if the segment that joins v, 
with the center of N¡ intersects A (part of the border of the 
neighborhood), the distance from v, to A is attained at this 
intersection point. Otherwise, it is attained at one of the 
extreme points of A. 
- Algorithm for the calculation of región B 
The following discussion develops the algorithm to 
determine the región B that provides the máximum number of 
voters for the second party for any locations of the first party 
in A The algorithm is based on the following idea: 
For all points (vj, v'2 ) , compute D¡, an elliptical neighborhood 
centered at (vj, v\) and with a radius equal to the distance 
from (vj,v'2) to A. Compute the máximum intersection of D¡, 
i=l,...n, that intersects with N2. One way to determine this 
máximum intersection is the algorithm developed by the 
authors, for which the procedure is detailed in Appendix A. 
This algorithm consists of applying n times the algorithm 
for calculating región A. Given that the latter has complexity 
0 ( « l o g « ) , the complexity of the whole algorithm is 
0 ( « 2 l o g « ) . It can be seen that the procedure presented here 
has the same complexity as that developed by [5] for 
calculating the máximum intersection of a set of circles, thus 
representing an alternative to that algorithm in the case of 
ellipses. In any case, there exists an algorithm that calculates 
the región of máximum intersection of a circle arrangement 
slightly faster [10], [21]. In spite of this, the algorithm 
developed here is easier to implement, so it is preferable for 
practical purposes 
IV. SlMULATTON OF AN EXAMPLE FROM THE NATIONAL 
POLITICS OF SPATN 
The game developed here has been simulated using an 
example of political competition in Spain. Because the game is 
two-dimensional, it was necessary to define a two-dimensional 
political space, and so two relevant issues had to be chosen on 
which the parties could adopt policies. In this respect, it was 
decided that education and health were two issues that 
nowadays concern the citizenry in Spain (a deeper explanation 
of howto construct a political space is given in [12]). 
To find the best positions for the parties in this simulation, 
the algorithms described in section III were implemented in 
the C programming language. 
Following the ideas enunciated in Section II, the following 
inputs were provided for the implementation: 
• The political plañe was determined using the 
percentages of expenses committed to education and 
health as derived from the Consolidated General 
Government Budget of Spam (1997-2006) [8]. These 
quantities were extracted from the expense statements 
(chapters 1 to 8). 
• The initial policies chosen by the first party (PSOE: 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español) and the second 
party (PP: Partido Popular) were determined using 
the mean percentages of expenditures dedicated to 
these two policies, as calculated from the total mean 
expenditure during two years of PSOE party 
government (2005, 2006) and eight years of PP party 
government (1997-2004): (xl0,yl0)=(0.6,l.4), 
(x02,y02)=(1.6,8.9). 
• The radius of the neighborhoods of political 
flexibility for the parties: Rj, R2. 
• The parameter a . 
• The 2276 voters and their positions v„ z'=l,...,2276. 
The location of the voters on the political plañe was 
simulated according to the ideological spectrum of 
Spain. 
For the initial policies used in this example, it was found 
that the voting intentions would give the victory to the PSOE 
(1277 voters) over the PP (999 voters). 
After applying the algorithm to these inputs, the outputs 
obtained are: 
• Región A 
• Numbers of voters obtained by the PSOE party by 
locating in A 
• Región B. 
• Numbers of voters obtained by the PP party by 
locating vaB. 
Twelve simulation cases were developed by considering 
1 1 2 
three valúes for the parameter a : (—,—,—) and four pairs of 
degrees of flexibility: (R1 =3, R2=l), (Ri=l, R2=3), (Ri=l, 
R2=l), (Ri=2, R2=2). It should be noted that the greater the 
valué of (X , the more important is the first issue. Moreover, if 
the flexibility of a party increases, then it can capture more 
voters. 
The optimum regions A, B and the percentages of votes 
obtained for each party in each case are presented in Table 1 
(in Appendix B) and Figures 4-8. The results obtained using 
this example show that varying the degree of flexibility of 
party policies and the parameter that weights the relevance of 
the issues significantly affects the máximum number of voters 
that each party can capture. 
Figure 4 shows that despite the greater degree of flexibility 
for the government party, the increment of voters captured 
when this party chooses a position is less than the increment 
obtained by the opposition party when it chooses a response if 
the first issue becomes more relevant (that is to say, if the 
valué of a is increased). 
Fig. 4 Percentage increments in vote capture for R¡=3, R2=l: the first 
column represents the percentage increments in vote capture when 
the government party chooses a position, and the second column 
those obtained when the opposition responds. The shaded región 
represents the party that changes position. 
Figure 5 shows that when the degree of flexibility of the 
government party is less than that of the opposition party, the 
increment in voters when the government party chooses a 
policy is insensitive to the weight given to the issues, but when 
the opposition party responds, the number of voters it captures 
increases with an increase in the degree of relevance for the 
first issue. 
Finally, as Figures 6 and 7 indicate, when the radii are equal 
for the two parties, the larger the radii, the greater is the 
increment in the number of voters captured for larger a , no 
matter which party chooses a position. Similarly to the 
previous cases, the responding party obtains an increment of 
voters that is greater than that obtained by the first party that 
chooses a position. 
As a general conclusión, the party that responds to the 
movement of the other obtains more votes because it has 
previous knowledge of the región where the other party must 
lócate. On the one hand, for low degrees of flexibility, there is 
little sensitivity to the degree of importance of the issues for 
either party. On the other hand, for small valúes of a , the 
response of the opposition is not as pro Atable for it as when a 
is large. 
Alpha=1¿3 
Alpha=1/2 
Alpha=2fl 
47 
Fig. 5 Percentage increments in vote capture for R¡=1, R2=3: the first 
column represents the percentage increments in vote capture when 
the government party chooses a position, and the second column 
those obtained when the opposition responds. The shaded región 
represents the party that changes position. 
Fig. 6 Percentage increments in vote capture for R¡=1, R2=l: the first 
column represents the percentage increments in vote capture when 
the government party chooses a position, and the second column 
those obtained when the opposition responds. The shaded región 
represents the party that changes position. 
Consequently, knowledge of the methodology presented 
here by pohtical parties may be useful for them to prepare their 
strategies. 
It should be noted that this example has been developed to 
¿Ilústrate the theoretical model. It does not claim to be an exact 
description of the pohtical reality of Spain. 
Fig. 7 Percentage increments in vote capture for R4=2, R2=2: the 
first column represents the percentage increments in vote capture 
when the government party chooses a position, and the second 
column those obtained when the opposition responds. The shaded 
región represents the party that changes position. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This research has dealt with the design of optimum political 
strategies in the face of significant changes in the situation that 
cali for making the requirements more flexible. This study was 
performed using a discrete geometric model based on the 
techniques of computational geometry. The result is not only a 
scientific description, but also one which is helpful in making 
decisions. 
It is known that the concepts of computational geometry 
applied to economics also make it possible to solve problems 
in the área of political economy, for example, the problem of 
winning the greatest number of votes. In this research, the 
techniques used have provided a new visión whose most 
relevant contributions are, on the one hand, the consideration 
of the variable importance of political issues in a country at a 
given moment, and on the other hand, the consideration of 
neighborhoods representing the degree of political flexibility 
which the parties may allow themselves with respect to 
particular issues. This flexibility is also affected by the 
importance factor for these issues, which may be indeterminate 
or imprecise. 
The techniques developed in this research enable political 
parties to design reply strategies by considering the options 
that their political adversary is likely to choose. Furthermore, 
an algorithm is provided that obtains optimum solutions for 
máximum vote winning for a variety of proposals. 
The algorithm developed here makes it possible to consider 
a wide range of cases illustrating various real situations, such 
as the importance of the issues considered, the flexibility of 
parties' political programs with the intention of winning 
elections, and the assessment of the possible strategies that 
parties can follow. This is a general model that can be applied 
to other location problems, not only in the field of political 
competition. 
APPENDK A 
a) Procedure to obtain the regional: 
Step 1: F ind / / and p" (Proposition 1) and define a counter c' 
with initial valué c' = 0. 
Step 2: Let L be an empty list, and let m be another counter 
with initial valué m=0. For each point v„ find the points of 
intersection between N¡ and the elliptical neighborhood 
centered on v, that goes through t2. 
2.1. If there is no such intersection because N¡ is 
entirely contained in the elliptical neighborhood 
centered on v, that goes through t2, increase m by one. 
2.2. If there is no intersection because the ellipses are 
disjoint, keep the same valué of m. 
2.3. If there are two points of intersection outside the 
part of Nj visible from t2, increase m by one unit. 
2.4. Otherwise: 
2.4.1. If both points belong to the part of N¡ 
visible from t2, then include both points in 
list L. 
2.4.2. If x'¡ belongs to the part of N¡ visible 
from t2 and x'', does not, then include x', in 
L. 
2.4.3. If x" , belongs to the part of N¡ visible 
from t2 and x', does not, then include x'', in 
L and increase c' by one unit. 
Step 3. Sort the points in L according to their angle with 
respect to / ; (clockwise). 
Step 4. Let c <—c'+m and x <— p'. Go through list L, 
proceeding as follows for each element: 
4.1. If it is an x'¡ element, let c<—c+l , and if c>m, 
then let m<— c and x<— x',; 
4.2. If it is an x'', element, let c<—c-l. 
Remark: If x'¡ and x" , coincide because the 
corresponding ellipses are tangent, x', is considered to 
be previous to x' ' , in list L. 
When the algorithm has completed execution, the counter m 
indicates the máximum number of points v, that the first party 
can win. The initial extreme point of the are of N¡ where the 
first party must be located is the point stored in the variable x, 
and the final extreme point is the point following that point in 
list Z,. 
b) Procedure to obtain the región B: 
Input: neighborhood N2 and n ellipses, Dh...,D„, which are 
assumed not to be tangent to N2, none of them contained in N2 
(this case is excluded from this approach), not all of them 
disjoint from N2, ñor all of them containing N2 (in these two 
cases, the área of máximum intersection will be N2 and the 
máximum intersection 0 and n respectively): 
Step 1: Intersect the borders of D¡ and N2 and find the two 
points of intersection ax, bx (if the borders are disjoint, go to 
Step 3). 
Step 2: Use the algorithm in a) to find the área of máximum 
intersection ofD2,..., D„ in the are oíD¡ which joins ax with 
¿j within N2, and the number kx of ellipses that intersect in 
this are. 
Step 3: Repeat Steps 1 and 2 for D2, ...,D„. 
Step 4: Among all the ares found in Step 2, select those where 
max k¡ is reached, j being the number of ellipses which 
have a non-disjoint border with N2. To this end, a list L is 
created with points ai, Pi, the extreme points of the ares 
obtained in Step 2. The ares in list L are not arranged in any 
particular order. 
Step 5: The intention is to obtain all the regions bounded by 
the ares obtained in Step 4 or the regions bounded by the ares 
obtained in Step 4 and the border of N2. There are two 
possibilities: 
5.1: The área to be found is solely bounded by the ares 
obtained in Step 4. 
5.1.1. Select the extreme points that delimit the first 
unused are of list L (cali them p l , p2). The are is marked 
as used. 
5.1.2. Search for point pl between the extreme points of 
the rest of the unused ares in the list. Given the are with 
extreme points ai,Pi where pl is located, with for 
instance pl=o; ¿ , then a new valué is assigned to pl (pl 
< - £ • ) • 
5.1.3. The search process is repeated as many times as 
necessary until pl=p2 (closed región). 
5.2: The área to be found is bounded by the ares obtained in 
Step 4 and by neighborhood N2. 
5.2.1. Select the extreme points that delimit the first 
unused are of list L (cali them p l , p2). The are is marked 
as used (as in 5.1.1) 
5.2.2. Search for point pl between the extreme 
points of the rest of the unused ares in the list. If p l 
is found in one extreme point of the are, the 
procedure in 5.1.2 is followed until pl is not located 
at any extreme point of an unused are; then pl 
belongs to neighborhood N2 (cali it pBl) , and pl is 
assigned the valué p2 (pl <— p2). 
5.2.3. Once again, search for point pl between the 
extreme points of the rest of the unused ares in the 
list, according to the procedure in 5.2.2. At this 
moment, point pl is a point of neighborhood B (cali 
it pB2). The are (pBl, pB2) in neighborhood N2 
belongs to the área of máximum intersection (closed 
región). 
Output: The regions found in Step 5 are the áreas of 
máximum intersection in N2 of the set of ellipses, while the 
máximum intersection is: 
Input 
RP=3 
RQ=1 
<x=l/3 
RP=3 
RQ=1 
<x=l/2 
RP=3 
RQ=1 
<x=2/3 
max k,• + 1. 
APPENDIX B 
TABLEI 
BEST POSITIONS FOR THE PARTIES IN THE VARIOUS CASES 
Movement of the 
government 
party: are on 
which it should 
lócate (P1,P2: 
boundary points 
of the are) 
Pl=( 
3.169501,4.593561) 
P2=( 3.174827, 
4.591416) 
Pl=( 
3.743043,4.249786) 
P2=(3.757103, 
4.234202) 
Another are which 
gives the máximum 
number of voters 
obtained: 
Pl'=( 3.512932, 
4.484611) 
P2'=(3.546029, 
4.453017) 
Pl=(2.596293, 
5.762297) 
P2=(2.599790, 
5.759092) 
Other ares which give 
the máximum number 
of voters obtained: 
Pl'=(2.535108, 
5.817093) 
P2'=(2.543070. 
Response of the opposition 
party: región in which it 
should lócate 
(extreme points of the ares 
enclosing the región 
indicated below) 
Ellipse 306 pl -^ p2 
Ellipse 1550 p 2 ^ p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 pl -> 
p3 
pl=( 2.418245, 7.820538) 
p2=(2.416555, 7.821072) 
p3=(2.405915, 7.815910) 
Ellipse 306 is centered on 
(0.564425,4-889248) and has radius 
2.621804. 
Ellipse 1550 has center 
(8.715210,1.321082) andradius 
6.433578. 
Ellipse 505 pl -^ p2 
Ellipse 1671 p 2 ^ p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 
P3 
Pl"» 
pl=( 2.337616, 7.791866) 
p2=(2.330703, 7.793956) 
p3=(2.247139, 7.763952) 
Ellipse 505 is centered on 
(0.530702,4.811335) and has radius 
2.647771. 
Ellipse 1671 has center 
(3.496017,6.098041) andradius 
1.539504. 
Ellipse 32 pl -> p2 
Ellipse 1671 p 2 ^ p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 
P3 
Pl"» 
pl=(1.694445,7.488944) 
p2=(1.688137, 7.490324) 
p3=(1.686692,7.488446) 
Ellipse 32 is centered on 
(0.365218,1.428697) and has radius 
4.387108. 
Ellipse 1671 has center 
(3.496017,6.098041) andradius 
1.613518. 
Ellipse 1132 p l ^ p2 
Ellipse 1607 p 2 ^ p3 
Ellipse 1364 p 3 ^ p 4 
Are in the boundary of N2 p 1 -> 
P4 
pl=(2.359936, 7.541695) 
p2=(2.283496, 7.603309) 
p3=(2.207489, 7.543660) 
p4=(2.136771, 7.343159) 
5.810098) p3 
RP=1 
R Q = 1 
a=l /2 
RP=1 
R Q = 1 
a=2/3 
RP=2 
R Q = 2 
<x=l/3 
RP=2 
R Q = 2 
a=l /2 
R P = 2 
R Q = 2 
a=2/3 
Pl=( 1.544457 
2.452616) 
P2=( 1.550957 
2.446748) 
Pl=( 1.572131, 
2.453529) 
P2=( 1.575781, 
2.446759) 
Pl=( 2.627055, 
3.386335) 
P2=( 2.717063, 
3.338820) 
Pl=( 2.095262, 
3.800873) 
P2=( 2.109216, 
3.792126) 
Pl=( 2.628924, 
3.340859) 
P2=( 2.639543, 
pl=(2.006948, 7.709539) 
p2=(1.952059, 7.721772) 
p3=(l.884102, 7.691843) 
Ellipse 418 is centered on 
(0.682940,4.806818) and has radius 
2.490286. 
Ellipse 2175 has center 
(7.491842,1.378939) andradius 
6.086933. 
Ellipse 700 p l -> p2 
Ellipse 1793 p2 -^ p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 p l -> 
p3 
pl=(2.379556, 7.720046) 
p2=(2.375580, 7.722411) 
p3=(2.328396, 7.687796) 
Ellipse 700 is centered on 
(0.596188,4.726646) and has radius 
2.463823. 
Ellipse 1793 has center 
(7.033595,1.323640) andradius 
5.596489. 
Ellipse 28 p l -> p2 
Ellipse 1138 p 2 ^ p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 p l -> 
p3 
pl=(2.116767, 7.329680) 
p2=(2.116462, 7.330045) 
p3=(2.115713, 7.328988) 
Ellipse 28 is centered on 
(0.328474,4.341029) and has radius 
2.260385. 
Ellipse 1138 has center 
(6.274364,1.439683) andradius 
4.805298. 
Ellipse 89 p l -> p2 
Ellipse 1307 p2 -^ p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 p l -> 
p3 
pl=(2.392977, 6.515552) 
p2=(2.345330, 6.533560) 
p3=(2.274134, 6.497341) 
Ellipse 89 is centered on 
(0.585031,4.164312) and has radius 
2.185202. 
Ellipse 1307 has center 
(7.419395,1.493408) andradius 
5.051481. 
Ellipse 1006 p l -> p2 
Ellipse 1855 p2 -^ p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 p l -> 
p3 
pl=(2.183080, 6.132326) 
p2=(2.177297, 6.137852) 
p3=(2.165887, 6.128760) 
Ellipse 1006 has center 
(0.551302,4.430235) andradius 
1.667306 
Ellipse 1855 has center 
(5.258916,2.258812) andradius 
3.503093. 
Ellipse 421 p l -> p2 
Ellipse 1628 p2 -> p3 
RP=1 
R Q = 3 
a=l /3 
RP=1 
R Q = 3 
a=l /2 
RP=1 
R Q = 3 
<x=2/3 
RP=1 
R Q = 1 
a=l /3 
Pl "=(2.545452, 
5.807996) 
P2"=(2.577728, 
5.779176) 
Pl=( 1.489680, 
2.450826) 
P2=( 1.499298, 
2.446724) 
Pl=( 1.544457, 
2.452616) 
P2=( 1.550957, 
2.446748) 
Pl=( 1.572131, 
2.453529) 
P2=( 1.575781, 
2.446759) 
Pl=( 1.489680, 
2.450826) 
P2=( 1.499298, 
2.446724) 
Ellipse 1132 has center 
(0.979778,4.242790) andradius 
2.213025. 
Ellipse 1607 has center 
(2.663161,6.509064) andradius 
0.703720 
Ellipse 1364 has center 
(5.771352,4.904492) andradius 
3.284684. 
Ellipse 743 p l ^ p2 
Ellipse 1172 p2 -^ p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 p l -> 
p3 
pl=(2.286557, 5.257979) 
p2=(2.266290, 5.268999) 
p3=(2.213969, 5.251504) 
Ellipse 743 is centered on 
(0 631504,3.751030) and has radius 
1.557882. 
Ellipse 1172 has center 
(4.873116,1.323127) andradius 
3.555998 
Ellipse 589 p l -> p2 
Ellipse 2076 p2 -> p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 p l -> 
p3 
pl=(1.925686, 4.669878) 
p2=(1.919273, 4.676218) 
p3=(1.907953, 4.668551) 
Ellipse 589 is centered on 
(0.637529,3.373318) and has radius 
1.292366 
Ellipse 2076 has center 
(4.179266,1.327515) and radius 
2.856692. 
Ellipse 1088 p l -> p2 
Ellipse 1259 p2 -^ p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 p 1 -> 
p3 
pl=(1.742155, 4.659742) 
p2=(1.740639, 4.661013) 
p3=(1.738912, 4.659634) 
Ellipse 1088 has center 
(0589114,3.286370) andradius 
1.268001. 
Ellipse 1259 has center 
(4.201648,1.577914) andradius 
2.789451. 
Ellipse 562 p l -> p2 
Ellipse 1172 p2 -^ p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 p l -> 
p3 
pl=(0.977010, 3.779085) 
p2=(0.976192, 3.779317) 
p3=(0.976182, 3.779287) 
Ellipse 562 is centered on 
(0 642039,1.412198) and has radius 
1.393624. 
Ellipse 1172 has center 
(4.873116,1.323127) andradius 
3.483528 
Ellipse 418 p l -> p2 
Ellipse 2175 p2 ^ p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 p l -> 
3.318469) Are in the boundary of N2 pl -> 
p3 
pl=(2.143013, 5.522090) 
p2=(2.141720, 5.523311) 
p3=(2.140787, 5.521376) 
Ellipse 421 is centered on 
(0.689233,2.445692) and has radius 
2.136288. 
Ellipse 1628 has center 
(6381564,1.429795) and radius 
4.191635. 
Ellipse 1145 pl -» p2 
Ellipse 1888 p2 -> p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 p 1 -> 
p3 
pl=(2.118679, 5.514451) 
p2=(2.116147, 5.515986) 
p3=(2.114849, 5.513282) 
Ellipse 1145 has center 
(0.894372,1.480718) and radius 
2.534354. 
Ellipse 1888 has center 
(6.421616,1.381399) and radius 
4.249272. 
Ellipse 1228 pl -> p2 
Ellipse 2154 p2 ^ p3 
Are in the boundary of N2 p 1 -> 
p3 
pl=(2.113209, 5.512784) 
p2=(2.102852, 5.518395) 
p3=(2.100366, 5.508943) 
Ellipse 1228 has center 
(0.979189,1.348329) and radius 
2.576476. 
Ellipse 2154 has center 
(6.276131,3.317988) and radius 
3.636588. 
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